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CITIZEN POLICE: USING THE QUI TAM PROVISION OF THE
FALSE CLAIMS ACT TO PROMOTE RACIAL AND ECONOMIC
INTEGRATION IN HOUSING
Jan P. Mensz*
Economic and racial integration in housing remains elusive more than forty years
after the passage of the Fair Housing Act. Recalcitrant municipal governments
and exclusionary zoning ordinances have played a large role in maintaining and
exacerbating segregated housing patterns. After discussing some of the persistent
causes of segregated housing patterns, this Note presents a novel approach to en-
forcing the Fair Housing Act and the "affirmatively furthering fair housing"
requirement on recipients of federal housing grants. This Note presents a citizen
suit that emerged from the Southern District of New York in Anti-Discrimination
Center v. Westchester County, where a private plaintiff successfully used the
False Claims Act to enforce the Westchester County's obligations to overcome im-
pediments to racial integration. This Note concludes by arguing for specific
reforms, regional coordination, and inclusionary zoning policies that recipients of
ftderal funds should adopt as part of a truly integrated fair housing policy.
INTRODUCTION
Since the 1950s and 1960s, major progress has been made to
combat de jure racial segregation in our schools, neighborhoods,
and workplaces. In seminal cases like Shelley v. Kraemer' and Brown
v. Board of Education2 , the United States Supreme Court struck
down the major legal impediments to integration. President Lyn-
don Johnson's Great Society marked a commitment by the
government to take affirmative steps to provide fair and affordable
housing throughout America. Yet after decades of white flight,
crumbling housing projects, and a growing gap between the rich
and the poor, neighborhoods in America are more segregated than
ever.
The disastrous effects of concentrated poverty coupled with en-
trenched racial segregation are well documented. Poverty is a
* University of Michigan Law School, J.D. expected 2010; Georgetown University,
B.A., 2005. I would like to thank Professors Judith Levy and Saul Green, whose course on
fair housing prompted my interest in this subject, Professor Rachel Croskery-Roberts for
nurturing my legal research and writing skills, and the members of the University of Michigan
Journal of Law Reform for their helpful edits. I would also like to thank my loving wife, Jean,
and my family for supporting me in writing this Note and in all my life endeavors.
1. 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
2. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
1137
1138 University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform
self-perpetuating phenomenon, as the net wealth of a child's par-
ents is an important factor for predicting academic success, which
in turn correlates strongly with future wealth Opportunities for
upward mobility are often tied to the informal social networks in
one's community, making isolated poverty difficult to overcome.
Concentrated poverty leads to increased pressures on law en-
forcement, infrastructure, schools, and families.5 Concentrated and
isolated poverty is also felt disproportionately by blacks, which
leads to racial animosity, despair, and, in some cases, violent riots.6
More than forty years after the passage of the Fair Housing Act
of 1968, 7 racial and economic integration has remained, for the
most part, an ideal. Despite the statutory and regulatory language
that requires the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Devel-
opment (HUD) to take affirmative steps to truly integrate
neighborhoods through its housing programs,' HUD has shown a
lack of political will to fulfill this part of its mandate. One of the
major impediments to a national policy of racial integration in
housing is municipal opposition, both through political pressure"
and zoning laws that keep low- and moderate-income housing from
being built in wealthy communities. ° In many cases, municipalities
will resist racial and economic integration while simultaneously
accepting federal money that requires them to take affirmative
steps towards greater integration."
3. See Dalton Conley, Capital for College: Parental Assets and Postsecondary Schooling, 74
Soc. EDUC. 59, 68 (2001).
4. See Richard Thompson Ford, The Boundaries of Race: Political Geography in Legal
Analysis, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1841, 1851-52 (1994). "All other things being equal, employers
would hire people they know and like ... ." Id. This process of accumulating "social capital"
begins in churches, schools, PTAs, Little Leagues, and other community-based associations
that "open the doors of opportunity in the business world" for parents and their children
later in life. Id. See also DOUGLAS S. MASSEY & NANCY A. DENTON, AMERICAN APARTHEID:
SEGREGATION AND THE MAKING OF THE UNDERCLASS 150 (1993) (documenting the close
connection between social and spatial mobility).
5. See MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 4, at 136-42.
6. Id. at 58.
7. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-31 (2006).
8. See 42 U.S.C. § 5304(b) (2) (2006).
9. See, e.g., United States v. Yonkers Bd. Of Educ., 837 F.2d 1181, 1205 (2d Cir. 1987)
(describing community opposition to housing integration plans); Ford, supra note 4, at 1864
(describing political resistance to diversifying communities through annexation).
10. James J. Hartnett, Note, Affordable Housing Exclusionary Zoning and American Apart-
heid: Using Title VIII to Foster Statewide Racial Integration, 68 N.Y.U. L. REv. 89, 96-98.
11. See, e.g., NAACP v. Sec'y of Hous. & Urban Dev., 817 F.2d 149, 155 (1st Cir. 1987);
Anderson v. City of Alpharetta, 737 F.2d 1530, 1537 (11th Cir. 1984); Otero v. N.Y. City
Hous. Auth., 484 F.2d 1122, 1133 (2d Cir. 1973); Langlois v. Abington Hous. Auth., 234 F.
Supp. 2d 33, 73, 75 (D. Mass. 2002).
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This Note will examine how the Federal False Claims Act
(FCA) , in conjunction with the Federal Fair Housing Act (FHA)
and its implementing regulations, 3 can be used as an effective en-
forcement mechanism of racial and economic integration policy by
penalizing local municipalities that shirk their obligations while
accepting federal funds. Part I begins by examining some of the
historic causes of housing segregation and why it persists today.
Part II presents a novel enforcement approach that has emerged in
the Federal District Court for the Southern District of New York.
This approach could have national ramifications in forcing all local
municipalities that receive federal housing grants to take aggressive
steps in furthering fair housing. Finally, Part III proposes affirma-
tive measures that courts and HUD should mandate on state and
local actors to ensure that all municipalities provide their fair share
of affordable housing. Specifically, Congress should make regional
coordination of housing policy and inclusionary zoning a precon-
dition for receiving HUD funds. Only by taking affirmative, local
measures to undo decades of segregated housing policies will we
have a realistic opportunity for economic and racial integration in
America.
I. HISTORIC AND CURRENT IMPEDIMENTS TO
RACIAL INTEGRATION
Where one chooses to live is a complex and personal decision.
Often, people who consider themselves progressive and inclusive
when it comes to issues of race give in to "more visceral personal
needs of comfort and security" when making housing decisions.1
4
Many find racial homogeneity to be more comfortable 5 and
stereotypes about minorities often lead people to believe that white
neighborhoods are safer.16 In other cases, pure racial animosity
12. 31 U.S.C. § 3729 (2006).
13. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-31.
14. SHERYLL CASHIN, THE FAILURES OF INTEGRATION: How RACE AND CLASS ARE UN-
DERMINING THE AMERICAN DREAM 3 (2004); see also Peter Applebome, Integration Faces a New
Test in the Suburbs, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 23, 2009, at WK3 (on file with the University of Michigan
Journal of Law Reform), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/08/23/weekinreview/
23applebome.html.
15. See CASHIN, supra note 14, at 10 ("Studies show that whites are willing to pay a 13
percent premium to live in all-white neighborhoods.").
16. See Camille Zubrinsky Charles, The Dynamics of Racial Residential Segregation, 29 ANN.
REv. Soc. 167, 182 (2003) (finding white perceptions of "joblessness, welfare dependence,
[and] proclivity to criminal behavior" as motivating aversion to black neighbors).
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drives individuals to live in communities of their own race.17 Per-
sonal preferences and prejudice are certainly impediments to
integrating our neighborhoods, but they are not the only factors at
play. Historically, government action, and inaction, have served to
institutionalize racial segregation and inflame personal prejudices
that have further divided our communities.
A. Historic Causes of Racial Segregation
One of the earliest legal impediments to racial integration to
emerge after the Civil War was the use of restrictive covenants to
keep minorities from purchasing houses in all-white neighbor-
hoods. The practice involved a legal contract, signed by a number
of neighbors, that prohibited owners from conveying their prop-
erty to minorities. 1 The agreement, or covenant, was restrictive on
current and future owners of the property and enforceable in
court.9 In Shelley v. Kraemer, the United States Supreme Court
found the enforcement of such agreements to be in violation of
the Fourteenth Amendment.0
Another way that municipalities have historically acted to institu-
tionalize segregation is through the placement of affordable
housing in traditionally black neighborhoods, thus perpetuating
the myths and realities of the black ghetto.2 In Gautreaux v. Chicago
Housing Authority,2 2 city council members in Chicago sought to
block the construction of affordable housing in their precincts af-
ter their constituents voiced opposition. 3 As a result, affordable
housing that was disproportionately inhabited by African-
Americans continued to be concentrated in historically black
neighborhoods and contributed to the continued segregation of
the city.2 4 After twenty-five years of litigation, affordable and racially
mixed housing finally began to spread to predominantly white sec-
17. While few respondents to social surveys will admit to harboring racial prejudice,
available data is highly suggestive. Id. at 185-91 (compiling the findings of four different
studies on individual racial preferences in housing). For example, in one study, when asked
what would be the racial composition of their ideal neighborhood, 25 percent of white re-
spondents preferred no blacks. Id. at 186 tbl.2. A preference for racial homogeneity among
whites was also highly correlated with high degrees of unfavorable racial stereotypes for
blacks. Id. at 188.
18. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 10 (1948).
19. See id. at 4-5.
20. Id. at 20.
21. M.ssEY & DENTON, supra note 4, at 56.
22. 296 F. Supp. 907 (N.D. Ill. 1969).
23. Id. at 910.
24. Id. at 910-11.
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tions of the city.25 In a similar case, United States v. Yonkers Board of
26Education, the city of Yonkers, and certain community members,
fought for years to prevent public housing from being built in
white neighborhoods and actively obstructed court-ordered reme-
dies for over fifteen years.2 ' Both Gautreaux and Yonkers
demonstrate how the placement of affordable housing and the pa-
rochial interests and prejudices of local municipalities combine to
perpetuate racial segregation. The cases also display the extent to
which localities will fight both economic and racial "outsiders"
from entering their communities and the difficulties in enforcing
fair housing laws.
B. Modern Impediments to Integration in Housing
Although restrictive covenants based on race are no longer en-
forceable, exclusionary zoning practices are in many ways the
modern equivalent. Zoning ordinances that restrict development
to single-family dwellings with characteristics that make average
prices higher (e.g., lot size, distance from the street, density restric-
tions), limit housing options in neighborhoods-and sometimes
entire towns-to the wealthy.28 While federal law does not prohibit
economic discrimination, often lurking beneath the surface of
these ordinances is racial discrimination. For example, in Anderson
Group, LLC v. City of Saratoga Springs,29 the City denied a developer's
request for a special use permit to build a development that in-
cluded sixty units of affordable housing. 0 The court found that
discriminatory remarks made at public hearings and statistics show-
ing a disparate impact on minorities were sufficient evidence to
conclude that the City of Saratoga Springs was in part motivated by
25. See generally, James E. Rosenbaum & Stefanie DeLuca, What Kinds of Neighborhoods
Change Lives? The Chicago Gautreaux Housing Program and Recent Mobility Programs, 41 IND. L.
REv. 653 (2008) (surveying experiences of low-income black families who moved to pre-
dominately white neighborhoods as a result of the Gautreaux decision).
26. 624 F. Supp. 1276 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
27. United States v. Sec'y of Hous. & Urban Dev., 239 F.3d 211, 219-20 (2d Cir. 2001).
28. See, e.g., S. Burlington County NAACP v. Twp. of Mount Laurel, 336 A.2d 713, 719-
20 (N.J. 1975) (finding residential zones were designated exclusively for single-family homes
that effectively limits housing in Mount Laurel to "persons of at least middle income"); see
also James L. Mitchell, Will Empowering Developers to Challenge Exclusionary Zoning Increase Sub-
urban Housing Choice, 23 J. POL'Y ANALYSIS & MGsrr. 119, 119 (2004); James J. Hartnett,
Note, Affordable Housing Exclusionary Zoning and American Apartheid: Using Title VIII to Foster
Statewide Racial Integration, 68 N.Y.U. L. REv. 89, 96-98 (detailing how exclusionary zoning
practices maintain enclaves of affluence or of homogeneity).
29. 557 F. Supp. 2d 332 (N.D.N.Y. 2008).
30. Id. at 335-36.
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a discriminatory animus.3 ' Courts may also find state action dis-
criminatory, absent overt animus, based solely on a disparate
impact theory by producing statistical evidence of a disproportion-
ately negative effect on racial minorities resulting from state
32zoning decisions.
Even where there is no explicit racial hostility, exclusionary zon-
ing can have the effect of perpetuating segregation in much the
same way as restrictive covenants. The connection between racial
and economic segregation is not hard to see. Because of historic
attempts to marginalize African-Americans through housing, edu-
cation, and professional opportunities, they are less likely to be
able to afford a house in a wealthy neighborhood. In a country
with such a recent history of legalized racial segregation and ra-
cism, even a "race-neutral policy [of housing opportunity] could be
expected to entrench segregation and socio-economic stratifica-
tion."33 In this sense, adopting a race-neutral policy towards
housing that fails to assess the inherent socio-economic disparity
tied to race is unlikely to significantly dismantle racial segregation.
Conceptually, restrictive covenants and zoning ordinances are
also similar in that they both attempt to artificially restrict entry
into neighborhoods by contracting and legislating the preferences
of the current population for future generations, thus ensuring
that the economic and racial make-up of the community will not
change. Despite popular belief, there is nothing natural or inevita-
ble about how we set municipal boundaries, whether in terms of
"geography ... , commitment to self-government or private prop-
erty., 34 Rather, municipal boundaries are the manifestation of the
initial inhabitants' values and preferences as demonstrated
through ordinances, exclusive zoning policies, and restrictive
covenants.35 By defining the terms of membership in a community
through zoning restrictions, it becomes unlikely that there will be
any challenge to these preferences that would accommodate
change.36 As a result, restrictive covenants and exclusionary zoning
make mobility between political spaces less likely and ensure that
historic housing patterns based on explicit racial animosity will
remain unchanged.
31. Id. at 340-41.
32. See Huntington Branch NAACP v. Town of Huntington, 844 F.2d 926, 937 (2d
Cir.), affd per curiam, 488 U.S. 15 (1988); Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Vill. of Arlington
Heights, 558 F.2d 1283, 1290 (7th Cir. 1977).
33. Ford, supra note 4, at 1852.
34. Id. at 1857.
35. See id. at 1871.
36. See id.
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This brief overview of some of the historic and modern impedi-
ments to integration shows that exclusionary zoning and the
placement of affordable housing, as determined at the local level,
serves to perpetuate racial segregation, even when these decisions
are not motivated by racism. So long as zoning powers are con-
trolled by local governments and decisions regarding the
placement of affordable housing are controlled by localities, segre-
gation is unlikely to be eliminated. Gautreux and Yonkers also
demonstrate the extent of community opposition to affordable
housing placement and the difficulties of enforcing fair housing
laws through traditional court action. New enforcement mecha-
nisms and incentives must be developed to force municipalities to
take racial segregation seriously and to consider the interests of
those living outside their borders.
C. The Promise and Failures of the Fair Housing Act of 1968
and Subsequent Enforcement
The Fair Housing Act (FHA) of 1968 promised to begin a new
era of racial and economic opportunity in housing.3 7 Senator Wal-
ter Mondale, the chief sponsor of the FHA, asserted that the
purpose of the law was "to replace the ghettos 'by [sic] truly inte-
grated and balanced living patterns.' 3 8 Senator William Proxmire,
a co-sponsor of the FHA on the Senate, Banking and Currency
Committee, stated rather loftily that Title VIII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1968 will establish a "policy of dispersal through open hous-
ing ... look[ing] to the eventual dissolution of the ghetto and the
construction of low and moderate income housing in the sub-
urbs.0 9 While the FHA "was designed primarily to prohibit
discrimination in the sale, rental, financing, or brokerage of private
housing, and to provide federal enforcement procedures for
remedying such discrimination,"40 the Act also charged the Secre-
tary of HUD, and through him other agencies administering
federally assisted housing programs, with considering "the impact
of proposed public housing programs on the racial concentration
in the area in which the proposed housing is to be built.'
1
37. See 114 CONG. REc. 3421-22 (1968) (statement of Sen. Mondale).
38. Trafficante v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205, 211 (1972) (quoting 114 CONG.
Rc. 3422 (1968) (statement of Sen. Mondale)).
39. 114 CONG. REc. 2985 (1968) (statement of Sen. Proxmire).
40. Otero v. N.Y. City Hous. Auth., 484 F.2d 1122, 1133 (2d Cir. 1973).
41. Id. at 1134.
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HUD's obligations under the FHA, however, go beyond adminis-
tering housing programs in a non-discriminatory fashion.2 The
statute instructs HUD to administer its grant programs so as "af-
firmatively to further" the Act's goals of true integration.2 In
Shannon v. U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, the
Third Circuit Court of Appeals traced the evolution of Congress'
housing policy from one that was neutral on race to one that
sought to promote racial integration in housing, with the goal of
undoing the effects of decades of segregation." The court ex-
plained that the 1949 Housing Act was neutral on race and did
nothing to address the private and government actions that con-
tributed to racial segregation. 45 The passage of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964 went one step further by prohibiting public housing pro-
grams that had discriminatory effects, but did not explicitly
embrace an active policy of housing integration.6 Finally, the FHA
charged the Secretary of HUD with affirmatively promoting fair
housing.47 As expressed by a supporting Senator, the purpose of the
FHA was to remedy the "weak intentions" that have led to the fed-
eral government "sanctioning discrimination in housing
throughout this Nation."4 Provisions of the FHA offered the prom-
ise of widespread integration, both by policing the private housing
market and by affirmatively administering programs that would
undo years of government-sanctioned racial segregation.
Since the beginning of the fair housing movement and the civil
rights movement, there has been tension between the twin goals of
increasing the stock of affordable housing and increasing racial
integration in housing. Arguably, building massive high-rises on
cheap land will produce the greatest number of housing units per
dollar. However, cheap land is often found in already economically
depressed minority neighborhoods, and adding hundreds of af-
fordable housing units leads to further economic and racial
isolation. The tension between increasing the number of units of
42. See NAACP v. Sec'y of Hous. & Urban Dev., 817 F.2d 149, 154 (1st Cir. 1987) (cit-
ing 42 U.S.C. § 3608(e) (5) (2006)).
43. Id.
44. Shannon v. U.S. Dep't of Hous. & Urban Dev., 436 F.2d 809,816 (3d. Cir. 1970).
45. See id.
46. See id.
47. Id.
48. Michael Allen, Strong Enforcement is Required to Promote Integration on the Ba-
sis of Race and Disability, Testimony at the Public Hearing at the National Commission on
Fair Housing and Equal Opportunity 1 (Sept. 22, 2008) [hereinafter Michael Allen, Testi-
mony] (quoting 114 CONG. REc. 2281 (1968) (statement of Sen. Brooke)) (on file with the
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform), available at http://www.prrac.org/projects/
fair_housing_commission/boston/allen.pdf.
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affordable housing and increasing racial integration was exempli-
fied in Otero v. New York City Housing Authority,49 where the
defendant Housing Authority alleged that it was faced with the
choice of preferring white tenants in a new housing development
(effectively establishing a quota) or risk tipping the racial composi-
tion of the neighborhood towards further non-white
"ghettoization.""° Ultimately, the court found that considerations of
racial integration could justify limiting the number of units avail-
able to blacks, though the burden on the defendants to show a
genuine need for such quotas is a "heavy one., 51 The FHA offers no
guidance for balancing these competing concerns but both must
be given due weight in promulgating an effective fair housing pro-
gram.
Although HUD and its local affiliates have been empowered to
tackle the difficult problem of persistent racial segregation, they
have not always had the political will to do so. Over the course of
the last half-century, the goal of increasing the stock of affordable
housing has won out, often to the detriment of racial integration.
Affordable housing, as typified by the housing projects in Gout-
reaux, is frequently built in large apartment buildings on the
cheapest available land, in the least politically resistant neighbor-
hoods.52 Given finite government resources, such a policy makes
sense if the only goal is to create as much affordable housing as
possible. Unfortunately, as discussed above, the result of concen-
trating affordable housing in poor neighborhoods is increased
segregation and the perpetuation of poverty among minorities.
Any comprehensive fair housing policy will need to include an en-
forcement mechanism to ensure that HUD and local authorities
take the politically difficult steps necessary to address racial and
economic segregation. The next section discusses a novel
approach to private enforcement of the FHA, brought by the
Anti-Discrimination Center of New York, that promises to have
widespread impact on how municipalities use HUD grants to pro-
mote fair housing.
49. 484 F.2d 1122 (2d Cir. 1973).
50. Id. at 1124, 1136.
51. Id. at 1136.
52. MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 4, at 56.
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II. Anti-Discrimination Center v. Westchester County:
USING THE FALSE CLAIMS ACT TO PROMOTE
RACIAL AND ECONOMIC INTEGRATION
Private citizens, and the non-profit organizations that represent
them, provide an alternative to HUD in the legal battle against ra-
cial segregation. Whether it has been by suing HUD to comply with
its own enabling statutes, or by suing local municipalities to comply
with HUD regulations, private citizens and non-profit organiza-
tions, including the NAACP, the ACLU, and fair housing centers,
have waged painstaking battles to ensure that the promise of the
FHA and Civil Rights legislation has a chance to become a reality.
53
This section presents one such case in the U.S. District Court for
the Southern District of New York, Anti-Discrimination Center v. West-
chester County, which uses the False Claims Act to promote racial
and economic integration.54
A. Background
Anti-Discrimination Center v. Westchester County involves a dispute
over the administration of a popular HUD grant program by mu-
nicipalities in the County of Westchester, New York.55 Westchester, a
suburb of New York City, is one of the wealthiest counties in Amer-
ica.5 6 The New York metropolitan area and its surrounding suburbs
is also one of the most segregated regions in America.5 According
to data from the 2000 U.S. Census and data provided by the
County itself, more than half of the municipalities in Westchester
53. See, e.g., NAACP v. Sec'y of Hous. & Urban Dev., 817 F.2d 149 (1st Cir. 1987);
Shannon v. U.S. Dep't of Hous. & Urban Dev., 436 F.2d 809 (3d Cir. 1970); Gautreaux v.
Chi. Hous. Auth., 296 F. Supp. 907 (N.D. Ill. 1969).
54. United States ex rel. Anti-Discrimination Ctr. of Metro N.Y., Inc. v. Westchester
County, 495 F. Supp. 2d 375, 376 (S.D.N.Y. 2007).
55. Id. at 376.
56. According to data provided by the Bureau of Economic Statistics of the U.S. De-
partment of Commerce, Westchester County's per capita income ranked seventh among
counties in the United States. BUREAU OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, REGIONAL ECONOMIC Ac-
COUNTS: PER CAPITA INCOME BY COUNTY FOR 2007 (2007) http://www.bea.gov/
regional/reis/crius.cfm (on file with the University of MichiganJournal of Law Reform).
57. John Iceland, Daniel H. Weinberg & Erika Steinmetz, Racial and Ethnic Residen-
tial Segregation in the United States: 1980-2000 5, thl. Al (unpublished paper, on file with
the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform), available at http://www.census.gov/
hhes/www/housing/housingpatterns/working.papers.html. New York ranks third on the
study's dissimilarity index, which measures the amount of movement that would be neces-
sary to achieve perfectly integrated neighborhoods according to the racial makeup of the
region, and first on the isolation index, which measures the extent to which minority mem-
bers are exposed only to one another. Id.
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have a population of less than three percent black citizens, despite
a large population of black residents in pockets of the county."
The average non-Hispanic white neighborhood is 92.4 percent
white (considering only non-Hispanic blacks and whites) and the
average non-Hispanic black neighborhood is 65.8 percent non-
Hispanic black.59 Despite an apparent end to dejure segregation in
the 1950s and 60s, measures of racial isolation and concentration
among blacks more than doubled in Westchester County between
1950 and 2000.60
Westchester County was also the setting for United States v. Yonkers
Board of Education, a fifteen-year desegregation battle in which
white residents and their city council representatives fought to
keep affordable housing from being built in predominantly white
neighborhoods. 6' Not surprisingly, many of the municipalities in
Westchester continue to resist efforts to build affordable housing
within their borders.2 Westchester acknowledged local resistance
to affordable housing,63 but maintained that a cooperative ap-
proach was the "most prudent, realistic, and productive
approach."6 Rather than withhold funding from municipalities for
failing to affirmatively further fair housing, the County acquiesced
to local resistance and continued to build affordable housing in
predominantly black municipalities. 65 Despite the long history of
racial tensions in Westchester County and the stark data that re-
vealed racial isolation among blacks, Westchester failed to consider
race as an impediment to fair housing during the six-year period it
66participated in the HUD-funded program.
The plaintiff Anti-Discrimination Center claimed that West-
chester County defrauded the federal government by accepting
more than $52 million in federal funds over a six-year period and
certifying that it would affirmatively further fair housing, even
though it ignored race as an impediment to achieving the goals of
58. United States ex rel. Anti-Discrimination Ctr. of Metro N.Y., Inc. v. Westchester
County, No. 06-CV-2860, 2008 WL 6802246, at *10 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2008).
59. Expert Report of Andrew Beveridge 21, United States ex rel. Anti-Discrimination
Ctr. of Metro N.Y., Inc. v. Westchester County, No. 06-CV-02860 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2008)
(Document 81-6).
60. Id. 27.
61. 624 F. Supp. 1276 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
62. United States ex rel. Anti-Discrimination Ctr. of Metro N.Y., Inc. v. Westchester
County, No. 06-CV-2860, 2009 WL 455269, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 24, 2009) (summary judg-
ment opinion).
63. Id.
64. Id. at *16.
65. Id. at *10, *16.
66. Id. at *13.
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the program.6 ' Although Westchester County vigorously fought the
lawsuit, the court ultimately accepted the Anti-Discrimination Cen-
ter's argument and granted summary judgment on most of its
claims." Faced with roughly $180 million in penalties (due to
treble damages as well as statutory damages) and the prospect of
losing another $30 million in HUD funding, the County finally set-
fled, agreeing to pay a $52 million fine and, among other things,
begin building affordable housing units in the affluent white sub-
urban towns across the county.69
B. False Claims Act
The Anti-Discrimination Center's legal argument focused on
three major statutes and their implementing regulations:0 (1) the
False Claims Act,7 (2) the Fair Housing Act,72 and (3) the Housing
and Community Development Act of 1974.7" The remainder of this
section carefully examines the False Claims Act and analyzes how
the Anti-Discrimination Center used the Act to enforce the fair
housing provisions of the Fair Housing Act and the Housing and
Community Development Act.
1. History and Overview
The False Claims Act (FCA), also known as the "Lincoln Law,"
was enacted in 1863 in response to Union Army contractors who
engaged in fraud, price-gouging, and supplying the army with de-
fective weapons and supplies.74 The FCA gave the government new
tools and more stringent penalties that went beyond common law
fraud to fight crooked contractors. In its original form, the FCA
67. United States ex rel. Anti-Discrimination Ctr. of Metro N.Y., Inc. v. Westchester
County, No. 06-CV-2860, 2008 WL 6802246, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2008).
68. See id.
69. Sam Roberts, Housing Accord in Westchester, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 11, 2009, at Al. The
Westchester County Board of Legislators approved the settlement in a 12-5 vote on Septem-
ber 23, 2009. Mike Jaccarino, Westchester Oks Affordable Housing Push in Posh Nabes, N.Y. DAILY
NEWS, Sept. 24, 2009, at 49.
70. United States ex rel. Anti-Discrimination Ctr. of Metro N.Y., Inc. v. Westchester
County, 668 F. Supp. 2d 548,551 (S.D.N.Y 2009).
71. 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729-33 (2006).
72.42 U.S.C. §§ 3608-19 (2006).
73.42 U.S.C. § 5304(b) (2) (2006).
74. 1 JOHN T. BOESE, CIVIL FALSE CLAIMS AND Qui TAM ACTIONS 1-3 (3d ed. Supp.
2010-1); see also Vt. Agency of Natural Res. v. United States ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765, 781
(2000).
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offered double damages, as well as $2,000, for each false claim
made by a contractor.75
The truly unique provision in the FCA, however, was the qui
tam 6 cause of action, which gave standing to any individual to
bring a suit on behalf of the government for a false claim made by
a contractor. Qui tam actions have been around since the thir-
teenth century in England," when private parties used them as a
means of gaining access to the royal courts because the king's in-
terests could be adjudicated only in this setting. In modern times,
granting private citizens with prosecutorial-type power has been
used to combat the lack of an effective governmental enforcement
body or a corrupt police force. 79 The qui tam provision of the FCA
was directed at whistleblowers and disenchanted employees who
were often the only means for uncovering evidence of malfeasance
by government contractors. s° Often these "informers" did not
themselves have clean hands, and one Senator who sponsored the
FCA described the purpose of the qui tam action as "setting a rogue
to catch a rogue.,81
Enforcement by private citizens, referred to as relators, s2 was a
key element of the Act. Providing private citizens with an incentive
to enforce the FCA brought the potential for a more dynamic en-
forcement of government interests and an extra level of protection
to the public treasury. Courts viewed the role of the citizen as
countering the "slow-going public vessel" of government enforce-
ment and moving quickly and effectively to protect government
policy and funds. 3
Despite its promise for wide use and ample damages, the FCA
fell into relative obscurity until World War II, when government
spending and the use of private contractors exploded. 4 With the
growth of government assistance programs in the post-World War
II period, the FCA "began to be used by the government against
75. 1 BOESE, supra note 74, at 1-10.
76. Qui tam is short for the Latin phrase: "qui tam pro domino rege quam pro se ipso,"
which translates roughly to "he who acts on the King's behalf as well as his own." I BOESE,
supra note 74, at 1-7.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 1-9.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 1-9 & n.28 (quoting CONG. GLOBE, 37th Cong., 3d Sess. 955-56 (1863) (re-
marks of Sen. Howard)).
82. The term "relator" describes the party who brings a suit on behalf of the govern-
ment. See BLAcK's LAw DICTIONARY 621 (8th ed. 2004) (defining "ex rel.").
83. 1 BOESE, supra note 74, at 1-11 (quoting United States v. Griswold, 24 F. 361, 366
(D. Or. 1885)).
84. Id. at 1-13.
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persons and corporations other than government contractors. ""'
For example, programs including agriculture and housing subsi-
dies, Medicare, and Food Stamps all expanded the context of the
FCA.16 Enforcement of the Act changed from focusing primarily on
military spending to encompassing numerous social welfare poli-
cies, touching on almost every area involving government
spending.87 At the same time the FCA was being revived, the qui tam
provision of the FCA was significantly curtailed in amendments to
the Act in 1943."8 Congress feared private plaintiffs, who had done
little to expose fraud or contribute to the prosecution, would sim-
ply re-file government claims and collect a large portion of the
government's damages. 9 For the next forty years, the FCA became
primarily a government tool. 90
In 1986, however, Congress revived the dual purpose of the FCA
as both a strong anti-fraud measure to deter recipients of govern-
ment funds as well as a check on lax government enforcement.
The 1986 amendments bolstered the qui tam provision and in-
creased the monetary penalties to potential defrauders. 9' One of
the provisions of the 1986 amendments lowered the in-
tent/knowledge requirement from specific intent to defraud the
government to something akin to gross negligence. 92 The amend-
ments also increased damages from double to treble damages and
updated the penalty from $2,000 per false claim to between $5,000
and $10,000 per false claim.93 It also expanded the role of qui tam
relators by repealing the government's veto power over claims
94
and by increasing the percentage of damages recoverable under
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. 89 CONG. REC. 7570-71 (1943) (statement of Sen. Van Nuys). See, e.g., United
States ex reL Marcus v. Hess, 317 U.S. 537 (1943). In Hess, the qui tam relator made a direct
copy of the government's criminal indictment against Hess, re-filed it as a civil action under
the FCA, and was awarded half of the damages. Id. at 545-46.
90. 1 BOESE, supra note 74, at 1-13.
91. Id. at 1-21 to 22.
92. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(b) (2006) ("[T~he terms 'knowing' and 'knowingly' mean that a
person, with respect to information[,] (1) has actual knowledge of the information; (2) acts
in deliberate ignorance of the truth or falsity of the information; or (3) acts in reckless dis-
regard of the truth or falsity of the information; and no proof of specific intent to defraud is
required."); see also, United States v. Entin, 750 F. Supp. 512, 518 (S.D. Fla. 1990).
93. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a) (2006).
94. Id. § 3729(d). It is precisely this problem of federal agencies becoming too cozy
with contractors that calls for allowing private citizens to independently bring an FCA ac-
tion. As this Note later discusses, HUD's inability to stand strong against local municipalities
that violate the Fair Housing Act is evidence of the propriety of applying the FCA to cases
such as Anti-Discrimination Center.
the Act by relators." The modem FCA signals a strong public pol-
icy commitment to combating "rampant fraud and governmental
acquiescence. 06
The types of parties that are found liable under the FCA have
also changed since its inception at the height of the Civil War. Al-
though fraud perpetrated by military contractors still commands a
sizeable share of FCA actions,97 in the last decade, healthcare fraud
cases have significantly outpaced military fraud cases. 98 One recent
qui tam action under the FCA resulted in a $325 million judgment
against a clinical medical laboratory for overbilling.99 The Act is
increasingly being applied to nontraditional areas such as envi-
ronmental compliance, financial services involved in the sale of
government bonds, the use of government land for oil, gas, and
mining extraction, and federal grants for scientific research. 0
As the nature of government spending evolves, so does the ap-
plicable contexts for FCA enforcement. Although the FCA is
commonly thought of as an anti-fraud measure, it is often used to
enforce compliance with government procedures and mandates.
For example, courts have found liability under the FCA in cases
involving non-disclosure of information in contracting,' substan-
dard testing of products provided to the government, 0 2 and false
representation of compliance with government regulations. 13 With
the growth of federal regulations, the federal government increas-
ingly attaches regulatory strings when allocating funds, making a
failure to comply with government policy and procedures-and to
accurately certify compliance-as egregious a violation as failing to
provide the service or product at all. It is these types of regulatory
95. Id.
96. 1 BOESE, supra note 74, at 1-17.
97. SeeJohn T. Boese, Fundamentals of the Civil False Claims Act and Qui Tam Enforcement,
in THE 7TH ANNUAL NATIONAL INSTITUTE ON CIVIL FALSE CLAIMS ACT AND Qui Tam EN-
FORCEMENT A-47 (2008). Qui tam and non-qui tam actions at the Department of Defense
totaled over $3.8 billion from 1987-2007. Id.
98. From 1987-2007, qui tam and non-qui tam actions at the Department of Health and
Human Services totaled over $13 billion. Id. at A-46.
99. 1 BOESE, supra note 74, at 1-37 (Supp. 2007-2)
100. CLAIRE M. SYLVIA, THE FALSE CLAIMS ACT: FRAUD AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT
§§ 2:12-2:19 (Andrea G. Nadel et al. eds., 2004).
101. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Atkinson v. Pennsylvania Shipbuilding Co., 2000 WL
1207162 (E.D. Pa. 2000) (alleging shipbuilding contract knowingly omitted significant costs
in contractor's final proposal to government).
102. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Compton v. Midwest Specialties, Inc., 142 F.3d 296
(6th Cir. 1998) (contractor supplying brake-shoe kits for Army Jeeps failed to periodically
test the products in conformity with government regulation).
103. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Fallon v. Accudyne Corp., 880 F.Supp. 636 (W.D. Wis.
1995) (military contractor's knowing failure to comply with environmental regulations even
though it certified that it would, constitutes a false claim under the FCA).
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compliance cases that formed the basis of Anti-Discrimination Cen-
ter's claim against Westchester County.
2. Mechanics of the False Claims Act
The elements of an FCA claim are detailed and complex and dif-
fer based on the type of claim at issue. This section discusses the
elements that are relevant to an FCA action under the fair housing
laws and that pose the most difficulty for a qui tam plaintiff. Several
treatises are available for a fuller discussion of the mechanics of the
FCA.1
0 4
a. Liability
The most common source of liability under the FCA is making
"direct" false claims to the government.' Section 3729(a) (1) of
the FCA provides that any person who "knowingly presents, or
causes to be presented, to an officer or employee of the United
States Government ... a false or fraudulent claim for payment or
approval ... is liable to the United States Government .... ,106 The
second source of liability is when a person "knowingly makes, uses,
or causes to be made or used, a false record or statement to get a
false or fraudulent claim paid .... ,'07 Liability for producing false
records or making false statements necessarily requires that a false
claim be made. l"" Where government contracts and grants require
certification of compliance with government regulations and con-
ditions, verification of actual compliance may require costly
oversight and extra layers of bureaucracy. The risk of false compli-
ance certifications is perhaps the greatest justification for a qui tam
action and treble damages, since it provides incentive for whistle-
blowers and private investigators to uncover deception that might
otherwise go undiscovered.' 9 Where the government lacks the re-
104. See generally 1 BOESE, supra note 74, at 1-3; SYLVIA, supra note 100; AMERICAN BAR
ASSOCIATION, THE 7TH ANNUAL NATIONAL INSTITUTE ON CIVIL FALSE CLAIMS ACT AND Qui
Tam ENFORCEMENT (2008).
105. Boese, supra note 74, at § 2.01 [A]; Boese, supra note 97, at A-3.
106. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1) (2006).
107. Id. § 3729 (a) (2).
108. Boese, supra note 97, at A-4.
109. See S. REP. No. 99-345, at 13 (1986), as reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5266, 5279
(enhancing the qui tam provisions is necessary to "break[] the current 'conspiracy of silence'
among Government contractor employees." (quotingJohn Phillips, testifying for the Center
for Law in the Public Interest)).
[VOL. 43:4
SUMMER 2010]
sources to audit every claim, such an enforcement mechanism al-
lows for efficient oversight." °
b. Qualified "Persons" Under the False Claims Act
Virtually any individual or corporate entity that makes a claim
for federal payment qualifies as a "person" for the purposes of the
FCA."' The statute is less clear, however, when it comes to public
entities. In Vermont Agency of Natural Resources v. United States ex rel.
Stevens," 2 the U.S. Supreme Court resolved a long-running circuit
split over the ability of a qui tam plaintiff to bring suit against a
State. In Stevens, the Supreme Court held that "the False Claims Act
does not subject a State (or state agency) to liability" in qui tam ac-
tions.' 1 The Court's reasoning was based on a historical and textual
analysis of the Act, and from the punitive nature of damages, which
the Court found did not typically apply to States."'
The Supreme Court, however, has found that municipalities and
county governments are "persons" subject to liability under the
FCA, in claims brought either by the federal government or a pri-
vate relator."5 Municipal governments are treated differently
because, historically, municipal corporations have been deemed to
be "persons" that "may sue and be sued.""16 Because a substantial
amount of federal aid goes directly to town, city, and county gov-
ernments, ensuring compliance with federal policies that form the
basis for allocating such funds is an important use of the FCA.
c. Qui Tam Provision
As previously discussed, the qui tam provision allows any individ-
ual or organization to bring suit in the name of the United States
government so long as they meet certain procedural and
110. See id. at 14 ("The bill adds no new layers of bureaucracy, new regulations, or new
Federal police powers. Instead, the bill takes the sensible approach of increasing penalties
for wrongdoing, and rewarding those private individuals who take significant personal risks
to bring such wrongdoing to light." (quoting D. Wayne Silby, representative of the Business
Executives for National Security)).
111. Boese, supranote 97, atA-7.
112. 529 U.S. 765 (2000).
113. Id. at 787-88. The U.S. Department of Justice, however, contends that it can still
sue a State for false claims under the Stevens decision. See Boese, supra note 97, at A-7.
114. Stevens, 529 U.S. at 780-88.
115. Cook County, Ill. v. United States ex reL Chandler, 538 U.S. 119, 132-34 (2003).
116. Boese, supra note 97, atA-8.
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jurisdictional requirements." 7 The mechanics of the qui tam provi-
sion are complex, but a major concern for the court on the motion
to dismiss in Anti-Discrimination Center was the "public disclosure"
jurisdictional bar."8 Although the 1986 amendments to the FCA
generally expanded the viability of the qui tam actions, drafters
were still concerned about "parasitic suits"' 9 coming on the heels
of government investigations or publicly available reports.20 As a
result, Congress attached a new jurisdictional bar that denied a
court subject-matter jurisdiction where the qui tam claim is
based upon the public disclosure of allegations or transac-
tions in a criminal, civil, or administrative hearing, in a
congressional, administrative, or Government Accounting Of-
fice report, hearing, audit, or investigation, or from the news
media, unless the action is brought by the Attorney General
or the person bringing the action is an original source of the
information.
2 '
"Original source" is defined as "an individual who has direct and
independent knowledge of the information on which the allega-
tions are based and has voluntarily provided the information to the
,,122Government before filing an action ....
In Anti-Discrimination Center, the plaintiff's claim was based on in-
formation requests under the New York Freedom of Information
Law (FOIL) ,12 which is the state equivalent of the federal Freedom
of Information Act. 2 4 One of the main questions that arose in the
motion to dismiss was whether the FOIL request qualifies as a
"public disclosure" for the purposes of the FCA, and if it does,
whether the plaintiff was the "original source" of the informa-
tion.2 1 Once a court determines that a claim is based on a public
117. See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b) (2006).
118. United States ex ret. Anti-Discrimination Ctr. of Metro N.Y., Inc. v. Westchester
County, 495 F. Supp. 2d 375, 379-83 (S.D.N.Y. 2007).
119. Boese, supra note 97, at A-17. "Parasitic suits" refer to complaints stating allegations
or information readily available to the public, for example, from government prosecution or
publicly disclosed investigations. It.
120. United States ex reL Marcus v. Hess, 317 U.S. 537 (1943). Hess is a prototypical case
of a parasitic suit, in which the qui tam plaintiff copied a criminal indictment of electrical
contractors and incorporated it into a civil action under the FCA, essentially adding no new
facts to the case but requesting half of any subsequent civil damages.
121. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(A)(2006).
122. Id. § 3730(e)(4)(B).
123. N.Y. PUB. OFF., art. 6, §§ 84-90 (2006).
124. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2006); United States ex reL Anti-Discrimination Ctr. Of Metro N.Y.,
Inc. v. Westchester County, 495 F. Supp. 2d 375, 380, 383 (S.D.N.Y. 2007).
125. Anti-Discrimination Ctr., 495 F. Supp. 2d at 379-80.
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disclosure, the plaintiff faces a high burden to show that he was the
original source of the information in the disclosure.
26
A circuit split has emerged with regard to whether administra-
tive reports produced by state and local governments qualify as
public disclosures that trigger the jurisdictional bar against qui tam
actions under the FCA. Although most circuit courts agree that
administrative reports produced by the federal government-such
as those produced through government audits or investigations-
do trigger the jurisdictional bar, they differ on whether the same
standard applies to state and local government reports. For exam-
ple, in United States ex. rel. Dunleavy v. County of Delaware, a local
government entity produced reports that contained the fraudulent
claims and thus formed the basis for the FCA allegations, and the
reports may have been the only way for a private citizen to discover
that a claim was made at all. 27 In Dunleavy, the Third Circuit Court
of Appeals interpreted the jurisdictional bar narrowly to allow for
qui tam actions based on administrative reports produced by local
government actors. 18 Although the court based this conclusion on
a textual analysis, it also reached its conclusion on policy
grounds.19 First, the government reports may have been the only
way for a private citizen to discover that a claim was made at all.
Secondly, the court found that applying the jurisdictional bar
would be a contradiction of the FCA's intent if the very reports that
were fraudulently submitted to the federal government would also
have the effect of immunizing the defrauder from prosecution by a
private citizen. Such a reading of the statute would contradict the
fundamental purpose of the 1986 amendments, which sought to
make it easier to uncover fraud when the defrauding party is the
only source of the information that would reveal the wrongdoing."'
The fact that the defrauding party in the case was a government
entity should not entitle it to greater protection than would be af-
forded a private contractor."3
2
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals took a slightly different ap-
proach in Hays v. Hoffman,33 finding that audit reports produced
by a state agency triggered the jurisdictional bar."34 Although the
126. See generally Rockwell Int'l Corp. v. United States ex reL Stone, 549 U.S. 457 (2007)
(describing the Supreme Court's test for meeting the "original source" requirement).
127. United States ex rel. Dunleavy v. County of Del., 123 F.3d 734 (3d Cir. 1997).
128. Id. at 745-46.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 745.
131. Id. at 746.
132. Id. at 745-46.
133. 325 F.3d 982 (8th Cir. 2003).
134. Id. at989.
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court distinguished the facts in its case from the facts in Dunleavy, it
found that in certain situations where the state agent is acting as an
auditor at the request of the federal government (as is required to
receive Medicaid payments), state reports would trigger the juris-
dictional bar in much the same way as federal audits.
Although the Second Circuit Court of Appeals has yet to weigh
in on the matter of interpreting the jurisdictional bar of the FCA,
in Anti-Discrimination Center, the U.S. District Court for the South-
ern District of New York followed the Third Circuit's reading of the
FCA and found that information gleaned from a FOIL request
made by a private citizen could form the basis of an action under
the FCA.136 As was the case in Dunleavy, the district court reasoned
that there was value in citizens investigating state files and bringing
evidence of fraud to the federal government's attention, and that
construing the jurisdictional bar narrowly was fully consistent with
the legislative purpose of the Act.
3
1
d. Scienter Requirement
To maintain liability under the FCA, the party making a claim
must knowingly make a false record or statement and must know-
ingly present a false claim to the government in order to receive
approval for a fraudulent claim. A person acts "knowingly" under
the FCA with respect to information where the person: "(1) has
actual knowledge of the information; (2) acts in deliberate igno-
rance of the truth or falsity of the information; or (3) acts in
reckless disregard of the truth or falsity of the information."3 9 Al-
though showing knowledge of falsity requires more than mere
negligence, the passage of the 1986 amendments made it clear that
the FCA did not require specific intent to defraud the govern-
ment.'4° By explicitly defining knowledge, Congress intended to
avoid "ostrich-like" conduct by corporations that would make re-
covering false claims increasingly difficult.1
4'
Difficulties in proving knowledge are especially pronounced in
cases that involve ambiguous regulations. Defendants often argue
that a reasonable interpretation of a regulation (that later turns
135. Id. at 988.
136. United States ex reL Anti-Discrimination Ctr. of Metro N.Y., Inc. v. Westchester
County, 495 F. Supp. 2d 375, 383 (S.D.N.Y. 2007).
137. Id.
138. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1) & (2) (2006).
139. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(b) (2006).
140. SeeSYLVIA, supra note 100, § 4:45.
141. Id.
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out to be incorrect) proves a lack of knowledge that the defendant
made false statements or claims. 4 2 Although courts have approved
of this defense strategy,4 3 a plaintiff or relator may still offer evi-
dence of knowledge of falsity that would contradict defendant's ex
post interpretation of the regulation and show that it is merely a
pretext.
C. Applying the False Claims Act to the Fair Housing Act Context
The case of Anti-Discrimination Center v. Westchester County success-
fully demonstrates how the False Claims Act can be applied to the
fair housing context to promote greater housing integration.'" The
Civil Rights Act of 1964," 5 the Fair Housing Act of 1968,' the
Housing and Community Development Act of 1974, 7 and their
implementing regulations form the basis for the certification re-
quirements of municipalities that receive Community
Development Block Grants from the federal government.
1. Community Development Block Grants
One of the most popular Housing and Community Develop-
ment programs administered by HUD is the Community
Development Block Grant (CDBG). The purpose of the CDBG
program is to "develop viable communities by promoting inte-
grated approaches that provide decent housing, a suitable living
environment, and expanded economic opportunities for low and
moderate income persons." 4" HUD defines community develop-
ment broadly to include activities such as providing housing and
community centers, rehabilitating public and private buildings,
acquiring property for public use, and other projects that serve the
142. Id. § 4:38.
143. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Oliver v. Parsons Co., 195 F.3d 457, 463 (9th Cir. 1999)
(finding that the reasonableness of defendant contractor's interpretation of applicable ac-
counting standards may be relevant to whether it knowingly submitted false claims).
144. United States ex rel. Anti-Discrimination Ctr. of Metro N.Y., Inc. v. Westchester
County, 495 F. Supp. 2d 375 (S.D.N.Y. 2007).
145. 42 U.S.C. § 2000a-2000a-6 (2006).
146. 42 U.S.C. § 3601 (2006).
147. 42 U.S.C. § 5301 (2006).
148. Office of Community Planning and Development of U.S. Department of Housing
and Urban Development Home Page, http://portal.hud.gov/portal/page/portal/HUD/
program-offices/comm.planning (on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law
Reform).
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general community interest.4 9 The program was established by
President Gerald Ford's Administration in 1974 and has since ad-
ministered nearly $120 billion to state and local governments. 50 In
2008, the program gave over $3.8 billion in regularly allocated
funds.' Currently, over 1,200 municipalities and counties in forty-
nine states and Puerto Rico receive CDBG funds.5 2 Grants range in
value from $72,000 for a small island off the coast of Florida to
$180 million for New York City.55 Because of their widespread and
sometimes substantial impact on municipal budgets, states and lo-
cal municipalities have come to rely on CDBG grants as part of
their efforts to combat urban blight.'
54
2. Affirmatively Furthering Fair Housing under the
Civil Rights Act and Fair Housing Act
As a requirement of receiving CDBG funds, grantees must sub-
mit certifications to HUD that they have "conducted and
administered [development programs] in conformity with the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 ... and the Fair Housing Act ... , and ... will
affirmatively further fair housing ... so as to give maximum feasi-
ble priority to activities which will benefit low- and moderate-
income families ....
149. Dep't of Hous. & Urban Dev., Description of State-Administered Community Devel-
opment Block Grant Program, http://www.hud.gov/offices/cpd/communitydevelopment/
programs/stateadmin/index.cfm (on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Re-
form).
150. DEP'T OF Hous. & URBAN DEV., FIsCAL YEAR 2009 BUDGET SUMMARY 8 (2008) (on
file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform), available at http://
www.hud.gov/about/budget/fy09/fy09budget.pdf
151. Id. at 12.
152. Excel Spreadsheet Detailing Individual Municipal Grants (on file with the Univer-
sity of Michigan Journal of Law Reform), available at http://www.hud.gov/offices/cpd/
about/budget/budget09/ (click "All Grants - Excel" hyperlink to download the file).
153. Id.
154. See, e.g., Community Development Block Grants: The Impact of CDBG on Our Communities:
Field Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Housing and Community Opportunity of the H. Comm. on
Financial Services, 109th Cong. 33-36 (2006) (statement of Clifford W. Graves) (on file with
the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform), available at http://
financialservices.house.gov/media/pdf/109-85.pdf; Press Release, Office of Governor Deval
Patrick, Governor Patrick Announces $40.4 Million in Statewide Community Development
Grants (Aug. 13, 2009) (on file with the University of Michigan Journal of
Law Reform), available at http://www.mass.gov/?pagelD=gov3pressrelease&L=l&L0=
Home&sid=Agov3&b=pressrelease&f=081309_community-development-grants&csid=Agov3
(quoting various members of the Massachusetts congressional delegation as to the impact of
CDBG funds on local communities).
155. 42 U.S.C. § 5304(b)(2)-(3) (2006) (internal citations omitted). The affirmatively
further fair housing ("AFH") requirement is set forth in the Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C.
§ 3608(d) and (e) (5), and is incorporated into the certification requirement of DCBG fund-
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The implementing regulations clearly set forth the condition
that grantees must "affirmatively further fair housing" (AFFH).56
Grantees satisfy this condition by (1) conducting an analysis to
identify impediments to fair housing choice, (2) taking appropri-
ate actions to overcome any impediments identified, and (3)
maintaining records reflecting the analysis and actions taken.
5 7
The court in Anti-Discrimination Center had to first determine the
scope of the AFFH requirement and then conduct a factual analy-
sis to determine whether defendant Westchester County had falsely
certified compliance. In ruling against Westchester County on its
motion to dismiss, the court found that the AFFH certification re-
quirement mandated that CDBG fund recipients analyze race as an
impediment to fair housing.58 The court came to this conclusion
by looking to the history of the passage of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, the FHA, and the subsequent case law interpreting the stat-
utes. 5 9 The Civil Rights Act provides that "[a]ll persons shall be
entitled to the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, fa-
cilities, privileges, advantages, and accommodations of any place of
public accommodation ... without discrimination or segregation
on the ground of race, color, religion, or national origin."' 6° Under
the FHA, "the Secretary is required to 'administer the programs
and activities relating to housing and urban development in a
manner affirmatively to further the policies of" the statute." 6' The FHA
was "designed primarily to prohibit discrimination in the sale,
rental, financing, or brokerage of private housing and to provide
federal enforcement procedures for remedying discrimination so
that members of minority races would not be condemned to re-
main in urban ghettos."
62
Given the clear legislative purpose of the FHA to combat racial
segregation and discrimination in housing, the court found that
ing by 42 U.S.C. § 5304(b)(2) and 24 C.F.R. § 91.225(a)(1) (2009) (incorporating AFFH
requirement into CDBG consortium certifications), 24 C.F.R. § 570.602 (2009) (incorporat-
ing non-discrimination requirements of the Housing and Community Development Act of
1975), and 24 C.F.R. § 570.601(a)(2) (2009) (incorporating AFFH into the administration
of CDBG programs).
156. 24 C.F.R. §§ 91.225 (grantees must actually conduct an analysis, take affirmative
steps to overcome impediments, and keep appropriate records), 570.601 (grantees must
certify that they have taken the required action).
157. Id.
158. United States ex rel. Anti-Discrimination Ctr. of Metro N.Y., Inc. v. Westchester
County, 495 F. Supp. 2d 375, 387-89 (S.D.N.Y. 2007).
159. Id. at 385-88.
160. 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(a) (2006).
161. Anti-Discrimination Ctr., 495 F. Supp. 2d at 385 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 3608(e) (5)).
162. Id. (quoting Otero v. N.Y. City Hous. Auth., 484 F.2d 1122, 1133-34 (2d Cir. 1973)
(emphasis added)).
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HUD was required to be particularly cognizant of race when ad-
ministering public housing. 163 Specifically, HUD must consider how
its housing programs might result in greater racial and socioeco-
nomic isolation.' Furthermore, the court found that HUD grants
were not intended as a passive prohibition against further dis-
crimination in housing, but as a tool to promote further racially
165and economically integrated housing patterns. In sum, the court
took the soaring language of the FHA and its drafters literally in
imposing positive requirements on HUD.
The obligations imposed on HUD by the Civil Rights Act and
the Fair Housing Act apply equally to CDBG fund recipients. Spe-
cifically, the grantee must "analyze the impact of race on housing
opportunities and choice in its jurisdiction ... [and] must take ap-
propriate action to overcome the effects of those impediments.
1 6
The court found that given the history of racial discrimination and
segregation in Westchester County, the explicit statutory and regu-
latory framework described above, and HUD's written guidelines,
analyzing race as part of the mandatory impediments analysis is not
a question of ambiguous statutory interpretation but an obvious
requirement. 67 To interpret the AFFH requirement in a way that
excludes consideration of race "would be an absurd result."1',
Westchester County argued that its obligation to analyze race
under the AFFH requirement was ambiguous at best, and there-
fore the County could not be held liable for making false
statements.169 The court, however, found that the lack of explicit
guidance on conducting an impediments analysis in the statutes
and regulations did not contravene the County's responsibility to
163. See id. at 387-88.
164. See id. at 385 (quoting Otero, 484 F.2d at 1133-34) (The FHA requires the Secretary
to "consider 'the impact of proposed public housing programs on the racial concentration'
in the area in which the public housing will be built.' "); id. (quoting NAACP v. Sec'y of
Hous. & Urban Dev., 817 F.2d 149, 156 (1st Cir. 1987)) (In administering its grant pro-
grams, "HUD must 'consider the effect of a HUD grant on the racial and socio-economic
composition of the surrounding area.'").
165. See id. at 385.
166. United States ex rel. Anti-Discrimination Ctr. of Metro N.Y., Inc. v. Westchester
County, 668 F. Supp. 2d 548, 552 (S.D.N.Y. 2009)
167. Anti-Discrimination Ctr., 495 F. Supp. 2d at 387-88 (motion to dismiss).
168. Id. at 388. Specifically, Westchester County argued that nowhere on the face of the
Fair Housing Act or the implementing regulations is race mentioned as an impediment to
fair housing. Requiring the consideration of race in the analysis of impediments was a "mat-
ter of policy difference" and, therefore, Westchester County's alleged false statements were
the result of inadequate guidance in the relevant statutes and regulations. Id. The legal
interpretation of "affirmatively further fair housing" was an unsettled legal question that
could not attach liability under the False Claims Act. Id. (quoting Troll Co. v. Uneeda Doll
Co., 483 F.3d 150, 160 (2d Cir. 2007)).
169. Id.
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analyze racial discrimination-"the core concern behind the pas-
sage of the Fair Housing Act"-as an impediment to fair housing.
70
The "knowingly" requirement, however, poses a significant road-
block to future litigation. Given the broad mandate imposed by the
FHA and its implementing regulations, coupled with the self-
regulating nature of the certification process and treble damages
under the FCA, future courts may find that the regulatory frame-
work lacks the clarity necessary to find a defendant liable.
Although the court in Anti-Discrimination Center ruled on sum-
mary judgment that defendant Westchester County submitted false
claims, the court ultimately held that there was sufficient evidence
on both sides to proceed to trial on the existence of knowledge. 7'
On the one hand, HUD repeatedly warned Westchester County of
its obligation to analyze race and provided it with written guidance
as to how to meet its obligation.72 On the other, HUD regularly
accepted Westchester County's impediments analysis that did not
analyze race, arguably leading the County to believe it was in com-
pliance with the law.73 The government's knowledge of the falsity
of the claim did not necessarily bar FCA liability, but it was "rele-
vant to the issue of the County's knowledge or reckless
disregard.'
174
With the aid of the U.S. Department of Justice, the parties in
Anti-Discrimination Center ultimately reached a settlement, 75 leaving
unanswered the question as to whether Westchester County know-
ingly submitted false claims. However, the court's summary
judgment decision puts other municipalities on notice of their ob-
ligation to analyze and address race as an impediment to fair
housing. In an announcement of the Westchester County settle-
ment, the U.S. Department of Justice underscored the "serious
commitment and responsibility to affirmatively further fair
170. Anti-Discrimination Ctr., 668 F.Supp.2d at 554 (quoting U.S. Dep't of Hous. & Ur-
ban Dev., Fair Housing Planning Guide) (summary judgment opinion). The court also
noted that HUD had provided guidance through its communications with Westchester
County on its impediments analysis and explicitly advised Westchester County that the pur-
pose of the impediments analysis was to "[a] nalyze and eliminate housing discrimination in
the jurisdiction" and to "[p]rovide opportunities for inclusive patterns of housing occu-
pancy regardless of race, color, religion, sex, familial status, disability and national origin."
Id. at 554.
171. Id. at 567-68.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 568.
174. Id.
175. Press Release, U.S. Department of Justice, Westchester County Agrees to Develop
Hundreds of Units of Fair and Affordable Housing in Settlement of Federal Lawsuit (Aug.
10, 2009) (on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/housing/documents/westchester pr.pdf.
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housing" that comes with accepting HUD funds, and the Depart-
ment's intention to enforce these obligations. 176 As the effects of
the Anti-Discrimination Center legal findings begin to influence fu-
ture cases and policymakers begin to enforce the AFFH
requirement, defendants will be less able to plead ignorance, mak-
ing the FCA a more attractive tool for private enforcement of the
fair housing laws.
Despite the progress Anti-Discrimination Center achieved in the
enforcement of fair housing laws, it leaves open the policy question
of what steps a municipality must take to overcome the impedi-
ments to fair housing posed by racial segregation and
discrimination. The next section will examine "fair-share" and in-
clusionary zoning policy as two methods that municipalities should
adopt to meet their obligations in administering fair housing pro-
grams.
III. LOCAL AND REGIONAL ZONING REFORMS THAT
AFFIRMATIVELY FURTHER FAIR HOUSING
This section proposes certain measures-specifically regional
coordination and inclusionary zoning policies-that are likely to
achieve greater racial and economic integration in housing. To
give greater force to the AFFH requirement discussed in Section II,
Congress should make regional coordination and inclusionary zon-
ing policies a precondition to receiving HUD funds. Although such
measures could be mandated by the courts, based on a progressive
interpretation of existing HUD regulations, states and municipali-
ties would be better served by making these obligations clear in
new federal legislation. Inclusionary zoning has already been im-
plemented by many states, but a federal mandate tied to HUD
funding would make integration a national priority with greater
uniformity and enforcement.
A. Mount Laurel and "Fair Share" Housing Obligations
The argument proposed in Anti-Discrimination Center that recipi-
ents of HUD grants must take affirmative steps to overcome racial
segregation and discrimination is by no means novel. One of the
primary purposes of the FHA and the establishment of HUD was to
"remedy the 'weak intentions' that have led to the federal govern-
176. Id. at 3.
[VOL. 43:4
SUMMER 2010]
ment's sanctioning discrimination in housing through this Na-
tion." 77 In cases like NAACP v. Secretary of Housing and Urban
Development7 and Shannon v. U.S. Department of Housing and Urban
Development,'79 federal courts have held that Section 3608 of the
FHA reflects Congress' intent that HUD use its grant programs to
assist in ending discrimination and segregation"O and "do more
than simply refrain from discriminating.'.'. Since local govern-
ments actually put the HUD grants to work, the onus is passed to
them to implement these lofty goals, often with little guidance or
oversight from HUD.
One of the preconditions for states receiving HUD grants
should be the dismantling of exclusionary zoning practices and the
adoption of affirmative measures to produce affordable housing in
all local jurisdictions. In Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Town-
ship of Mount Laurel, the NewJersey Supreme Court established the
seminal legal doctrine on inclusionary zoning practices and re-
gional responsibility for affordable housing."2 Although the Court
in Mount Laurel I chose to consider the case from the standpoint of
economic segregation, the case concerns racial segregation as well,
at least if one accepts that racial minorities are disproportionately
represented among the economically disadvantaged class.8 3
When the case began in 1974, Mount Laurel was a rapidly devel-
oping suburb of Camden, New Jersey.8 4 Because residents of
Mount Laurel wanted the community to develop into a low-density
suburb, the municipal government enacted zoning ordinances that
essentially restricted new residential development to single-family
detached dwellings with sizeable lots.' Although a few develop-
ments for rental units were approved under zoning variance
procedures, these projects were intentionally targeted toward mid-
dle class and wealthy individuals with few or no children. 6 The few
"pockets of poverty" that existed in Mount Laurel were "deteriorat-
ing or dilapidated," and would naturally be replaced by more
177. Michael Allen, Testimony, supra note 48, at 1.
178. 817 F.2d 149, 155 (lstCir. 1987).
179. 436 F.3d 809, 821 (3d Cir. 1970).
180. Michael Allen, Testimony, supra note 48, at 1.
181. Id. at 2 (quoting NAACP v. Sec'y of Hous. & Urban Dev., 817 F.2d 149, 155 (lst
Cir. 1987)).
182. S. Burlington County NAACP v. Twp. of Mount Laurel (Mount Laurel 1), 336 A.2d
713 (1975).
183. Id. at 717.
184. Id. at 718.
185. Id. at 719.
186. Id. at 722. The town specifically wanted to limit the number of families with chil-
dren because adding more children without significantly increasing tax revenue would
increase education costs and eventually lead to higher property taxes. Id.
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expensive dwellings as development expanded. 187 Such zoning re-
strictions were pervasive in the fastest growing communities across
the state."'
The NAACP brought a claim on behalf of poor black and His-
panic residents who were effectively being excluded from new
housing in Mount Laurel developments.9 The NAACP argued that
the ordinances violated plaintiff's due process and equal protec-
tion rights.' 9 Mount Laurel agreed that its zoning ordinances
excluded lower income individuals, but that the ordinances were
meant to protect low property taxes for existing residents. 9' The
court found that Mount Laurel could not "foreclose the opportu-
nity" for the development of low- and moderate-income housing
under New Jersey's Constitution, and that it must "affirmatively af-
ford [the] opportunity" to produce the municipality's "fair share of
the present and prospective regional need" for such housing.'9
In striking down Mount Laurel's zoning ordinances, the court
adopted a new interpretation of the underlying police powers from
which municipalities derive their zoning authority. Eight years after
Mount Laurel I, the court summarized the constitutional basis for
the decision in the follow-up case, Mount Laurel II'
The constitutional power to zone, delegated to the munici-
palities subject to legislation, is but one portion of the police
power and as such, must be exercised for the general welfare.
When the exercise of that power by a municipality affects
something as fundamental as housing, the general welfare in-
cludes more than the welfare of that municipality and its
citizens: it also includes the general welfare-in this case
housing needs-of those residing outside of the municipality
but within the region that contributes to the housing demand
within the municipality. Municipal land use regulations that
187. Id. at 718, 722.
188. Id. at 717.
189. Id.; see also Norman Williams & Anya Yates, The Background of Mount Laurel I, 20
VT. L. Rav. 687, 695-96 (1996). Although the NAACP's basis for its claim was racial dis-
crimination, the court considered Mount Laurel's zoning ordinances from the broader
perspective of all low- and middle-income residents in New Jersey. Mount Laurel 1, 336 A.2d
at 717.
190. See Williams & Yates, supra note 189, at 696.
191. Mount Laurel I, 336 A.2d at 730-31.
192. Id. at 732.
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conflict with the general welfare thus defined abuse the police
power and are unconstitutional.9
Mount Laurel I is best known for broadening the interpretation
of the General Welfare Clause to include regional housing needs
beyond the borders of the municipality defining the zoning ordi-
nances. The court left it to the State legislature and the
municipalities to calculate their "fair-share" obligation for afford-
able housing and what measures to take to promote those ends.
194
However, after eight years of legal confusion in the lower courts'
results, the New Jersey Supreme Court in Mount Laurel II explicitly
laid out some of the obligations municipalities had in making their
zoning practices more inclusionary and in promoting the devel-
opment of affordable housing.195 These practices can broadly be
described as regional coordination and inclusionary zoning.
B. Regional Coordination Measures
Traditionally, zoning policies are established through a compre-
hensive land use plan and then implemented at a local level.
Although a municipality's zoning decisions may have effects be-
yond its borders, planning usually only accounts for the "parochial
concerns of the zoning locality." 96 Several states including Califor-
nia, Florida, Oregon, and Washington have led the way in adopting
legislation that require localities to adopt comprehensive land use
plans that account for affordable housing needs. 197 Such regula-
tions require municipalities to analyze housing needs in terms of
the "locality's existing and projected population, current housing
supply, and available buildable land."l99 Many of these states pro-
vide various levels of regulatory oversight of local implementation
of their land use plans and, at least in Oregon, the State may with-
hold certain grant funds if the municipality is not implementing its
zoning laws consistently with regional housing goals19 Though
these legislative efforts are laudable, they lack the regional
193. S. Burlington County NAACP v. Twp of Mount Laurel (Mount Laurel I1), 456 A.2d
390,415 (1983).
194. Mount Laurel , 336 A.2d at 733-34.
195. Mount Laurel II, 456 A.2d at 415.
196. Jennifer M. Morgan, Comment, Zoning For All: Using Inclusionary Zoning Techniques
to Promote Affordable Housing, 44 EMORY L.J. 359, 372 (1995).
197. Id. at 372-73.
198. Id. at 373.
199. Id. at 373-74.
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coordination and strong enforcement mechanisms that are likely
to bring about real change.
In response to Mount Laurel I, the New Jersey State legislature
enacted the Municipal Land Use Law,2 which recognizes the role
of regional coordination in ensuring that individual municipalities
live up to their Mount Laurel obligations. 1 New Jersey's approach
went one step further than states like Oregon by passing the New
Jersey Fair Housing Act20 2 and creating the Council on Affordable
Housing that "supervise[s] the allocation of fair-share housing
burdens under the Act."203 Under the Act, municipalities voluntar-
ily submit themselves to review in exchange for protection from
lawsuits resulting from their potentially exclusionary zoning prac-
tices.0 4 The State coordinates localities by defining "growth areas"
through the State Development Guide Plan.20 5 The Plan allocates
housing obligations based on remedial, current, and future re-
gional needs, as well as by providing the time frame for
implementing development plans.2 0 6 Through legislative and
administrative means, New Jersey both ensures proper coordina-
tion of affordable housing needs and enforcement of each
municipality's "fair-share" obligations.
Regional coordination, much like the regulations implemented
in New Jersey, should be a mandatory precondition for a recipient
of HUD funding. Any meaningful analysis of impediments to racial
integration will find that parochial control of zoning measures ef-
fectively maintains our segregated towns. Before any municipality
can make a good faith effort toward affirmatively furthering fair
housing, it must understand the current and future regional needs
for housing in its relevant area, not just the needs of its current
constituents.
This shift away from parochialism in housing policy was the
spirit behind the Gautreux and Yonkers decisions.207 Regional coor-
200. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 40:55D-28(d) (West 2009).
201. Mount Laurel II, 456 A.2d at 417.
202. N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 52:27D-301 to -307 (West 2008).
203. Ford, supra note 4, at 1852.
204. Jason McCann, Pushing Growth Share: Can Inclusionary Zoning Fix What is Broken with
NewJersey's Mount Laurel Doctrine?, 59 RUTGERS L. REv. 191, 205 (2006).
205. Mount Laurel II, 456 A.2d at 418.
206. Id.
207. See United States v. Yonkers Bd. of Educ., 624 F. Supp. 1276 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); Gaut-
reaux v. Chi. Hous. Auth., 296 F. Supp. 907 (N.D. 111. 1969). Gautreaux, in particular, used
the entire Chicago metropolitan area, including surrounding suburbs, in defining the geo-
graphic scope of the court's remedy. Hills v. Gautreaux, 425 U.S. 284, 306 (1976). In
Anti-Discrimination Center, the plaintiff alleged that Westchester's failure to look beyond the
housing needs of its existing residents is a failure in its impediments analysis. Complaint
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dination and enforcement is particularly important when it comes
to fighting racial segregation because of the phenomenon of
"white flight," where fear of the changing racial makeup of a com-
munity causes white residents to flee to neighboring all-white
communities. The New Jersey Supreme Court recognized this dan-
ger in Mount Laurel IIwhen it emphasized the "fair-share" remedy:
No one community need be concerned that it will be radically
transformed by a deluge of low and moderate income devel-
opments. Nor should any community conclude that its
residents will move to other suburbs as a result of this deci-
sion, for those 'other suburbs' may very well be required to do
their part to provide the same housing. °8
Drastic changes in existing property values and a mass exodus of
current residents are legitimate concerns that illustrate the need
for regional coordination in implementing housing policy. That is
why Congress should mandate that municipalities engage in re-
gional coordination as a precondition to receiving HUD funds.
Regional coordination in zoning will ameliorate the fears that ex-
acerbate white flight by ensuring that no single community serves
as an exclusive haven for wealth and privilege while another be-
comes a concentrated center of poverty. Regional coordination in
zoning decisions is not only fair, but it is the only effective way to
meaningfully and permanently address racial segregation.
C. Inclusionary Zoning
In some cases, simply relaxing zoning restrictions will attract de-
velopers to build a more diverse range of housing options in a
community that had been exclusively zoned for single-family dwell-
ings. In other cases, however, incentives may be necessary to
promote the development of affordable housing in communities
where it does not traditionally exist. All municipalities that face
substantial economic and racial segregation should implement in-
clusionary zoning policies. The federal government in particular
should mandate inclusionary zoning in municipalities that receive
federal funds through HUD, as was the case in the CDBG program
in dispute in Anti-Discrimination Center
1 48-52, United States ex rel. Anti-Discrimination Ctr. v. Westchester County, 495 F. Supp.
2d 375 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (No. 06 Civ. 2860), 2006 WL 6348390.
208. Mount Laurel 11, 456 A.2d at 420-21.
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"Inclusionary zoning" is the label given to a range of develop-
ment tools used by municipalities to promote the development of
low- and moderate-income housing. °9 Typically, inclusionary zon-
ing either mandates or encourages developers to provide "some
minimum percentage (often 10-20 percent)" of low- to moderate-
income housing in new residential projects. 210 Municipalities often
211provide incentives to developers including density bonuses, re-
duced development standards, expedited processing, fee deferrals,
or loans and grants. Often municipalities will simply mandate
that a certain portion of the development be set aside for afford-
able housing, or require the developer to pay a fee to fund
affordable housing programs.213 Affordable housing fees may also
be imposed on non-residential developers, such as factories or of-
fices, that might increase the need for low-income housing due to
low-income jobs that the business attracts.
214
Inclusionary zoning programs have caught on in recent years
and can be found in states across the nation including California,
Colorado, Florida, Hawaii, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Jersey,
New Mexico, New York, South Carolina, Texas, and Virginia.2 5 In-
clusionary zoning measures are attractive in that they cost little or
nothing to implement and have some success in actually producing
affordable housing. For example, five years after the implementa-
tion of the Council on Affordable Housing in New Jersey, which
mandated the use of several methods of inclusionary zoning,
22,703 additional units of affordable housing were built in the
state .216
One of the criticisms of inclusionary zoning is that it makes the
availability of housing more remote for everyone "by raising prices
for market-rate buyers and discouraging builders."217 Discouraging
builders from building market-rate housing ultimately decreases
209. Morgan, supra note 196, at 369-84 (detailing the various techniques that have been
used to promote affordable housing development). See also Andrew Dietderich, An Egalitar-
ian's Market: The Economics of Inclusionaiy Zoning Reclaimed, 24 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 23, 45-46
(1996) (listing three regimes that fall under the rubric of inclusionary zoning).
210. Cecily T. Talbert, Nadia L. Costa & Kiran C. Jain, American Bar Association Section of
State and Local Government Law 2007 Report of the Inclusionary Zoning Subcommittee of the Land
Use Committee Current Issues in Inclusionary Zoning, SNO05 A.L.I.-A.BA 1537, 1539 (2007).
211. A density bonus allows a developer to build more housing units than authorized by
zoning regulations without acquiring more land. Id. at 1545.
212. Id. at 1539, 1545.
213. Id. at 1540.
214. Morgan, supra note 196, at 381-82.
215. Talbert, Costa &Jain, supra note 210, at 1539.
216. Morgan, supra note 196, at 369.
217. J. Peter Byrne & Michael Diamond, Affordable Housing Land Tenure, and Urban Pol-
icy: The Matrix Revealed, 34 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 527, 560 (2007).
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the supply of affordable housing, which is tied by inclusionary zon-
ing to new market-rate development.21s In addition, the
comparatively high cost of building low-income housing on expen-
sive land in affluent communities can be viewed as a lost
opportunity to build a greater quantity of affordable housing else-
where.219 Certain states' lawmakers have felt the need to balance
the competing interests of providing economically integrated hous-
ing and increasing the aggregate quantity of affordable housing.
For example, New Jersey tempered its Mount Laurel mandates by
allowing "municipalities to transfer up to fifty percent of their af-
fordable housing obligations to other municipalities."2° This
controversial provision "shifted the rationale of the Mount Laurel
doctrine from the broad goal of ending geographic segregation
surrounding inner-city minorities and toward the raw provision of
low-income housing., 221 In one instance, "four affluent towns paid
New Brunswick[, New Jersey] $7.65 million to accept their obliga-
222
tion to provide 406 units" of affordable housing.
Some municipalities have sought to limit the exchange provi-
sion's effect on the goal of integrating housing. For example, in
Montgomery County, Maryland, faced with a similar provision that
allows municipalities to exchange affordable housing obligations,
the County requires officials to first find that "the public benefit of
additional affordable housing outweighs the value of locating
MPDUs [Moderately Priced Dwelling Units] in each subdivision
throughout the County" before authorizing an exchange.2 Find-
ing the right balance between the dual fair housing goals of
integrating and increasing the supply of affordable housing is a
policy decision that must be made in light of the economic and
political realities of a particular municipality.
Relaxing zoning restrictions is the first step toward racial and
economic integration in affluent communities, but it alone is not
enough to achieve those goals. Inclusionary zoning measures such
as those mandated in Mount Laurel II are the types of affirmative
measures envisioned in the statutes and regulations that estab-
lished HUD,224 and should be a mandatory precondition to
receiving HUD grants. Given the discriminatory nature of
218. Id. But see Dietderich, supra note 209, at 84-102 (explaining how in a market with
inelastic demand and where the developer can price-discriminate among purchasers, the
developer can still make a profit and the supply of affordable housing will still increase).
219. Byrne & Diamond, supra note 217, at 561.
220. Id.
221. Id.
222. Id.
223. Id. at 562.
224. 42 U.S.C. § 5304(b) (2) (2006).
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traditional zoning policies and the widespread usage of inclusion-
ary zoning to combat economic and racial segregation, a
progressive interpretation of the requirement that HUD grantees
"affirmatively further fair housing" should put municipalities on
notice that they are required adopt such measures. Policymakers
should not wait for the courts to mandate such measures, however,
but should realize that it is in the collective interest of the state to
produce integrated affordable housing options.
One law professor, Charles Daye, has proposed a federal statute
that would explicitly mandate inclusionary zoning for any locality
that receives any sort of federal funding.25 In the spirit of the Gaut-
reaux and Mount Laurel decisions, the proposed statute defines a
municipality's affordable housing obligations in terms of regional
housing needs. 6 It both prohibits the practice of exclusionary zon-
ing as well as mandates "inclusionary policies and practices.
22 7
Such a statute would make explicit what HUD regulations already
imply in "affirmatively further[ing] fair housing."2 28 Citizen and
government suits under the FCA, as illustrated in Anti-
Discrimination Center, ensure that such a statute would be enforced
and that meaningful results could be achieved. Although extend-
ing such mandates beyond the scope of federal housing grants-as
Professor Daye envisions-might meet constitutional challenges
under the Spending or Commerce Clauses, such mandates
should be a necessary part of any comprehensive affordable hous-
ing program.
D. Criticisms of Inclusionary Zoning
The classic economic critique of inclusionary zoning is found in
Robert Ellickson's article entitled "The Irony of 'Inclusionary' Zon-
ing.',2 - Ellickson argues that there are inefficiencies inherent in
inclusionary zoning policies and that the policies end up hurting
225. Charles E. Daye, Commentary, Toward "One America": A Proposed Federal Statute Pro-
hibiting Exclusionary Land-Use Practices and Mandating Indusionary Policies, LAND USE L. &
ZONING DIG., May 2001, at 3-4.
226. See id. at 5.
227. Id. at 5.
228. See supra Part II.C.2.
229. Daye, supra note 225, at 4.
230. Robert C. Ellickson, The Irony of "Inclusionary" Zoning, 54 S. CAL. L. REv. 1167
(1981). Sixteen years after Ellickson's influential critique was first published, Andrew Diet-
derich offered a response using updated economic theories in support of inclusionary
zoning. Dietderich, supra note 209.
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the very people they intend to help. 3' First, because inclusionary
zoning acts as a tax on developers, developers bear this cost either
by losing profits, passing the cost onto consumers through in-
creased market-rate housing prices, or by ceasing to build
232
altogether, thus further aggravating the affordable housing crisis.
However, Ellickson mischaracterizes inclusionary zoning as a tax by
failing to distinguish mandatory set-asides that are not offset by
cost-saving density bonuses and other incentives from voluntary
policies that empower developers to bypass certain exclusionary
zoning requirements. 2 Far from being a tax, in most cases devel-
opers actively seek inclusionary zoning to build a more profitable
and diverse stock of housing.
Second, Ellickson argues that exclusionary zoning policies are
inherently efficient since they are a manifestation of the net social
preferences of consumers. 25 Housing developers seek to maximize
their profits by building housing patterns demanded by their cus-
tomers.36  If those customers valued economic and racial
integration more than stratification, then they would pay more for
integrated housing patterns and developers would build in con-
formity with consumer preferences. Ellickson argues that "the fact
that market forces tend to produce economically stratified
neighborhoods creates a prima facie case that this stratification is
efficient. "237 Ellickson's argument is flawed because it assumes thatS 238
market forces in housing are freely exercised . Although some
zoning measures can be efficient, zoning typically promotes car-
tel behavior among existing homeowners,2 ° acts as a subsidy for
single-family homes by giving such development exclusive rights to
land,241 and unfairly pushes negative externalities onto those out-
side the boundaries of the municipality.242 Even when inclusionary
zoning is mandated on developers, it does not necessarily lead to
231. Ellickson, supra note 230, at 1215.
232. Id. at 1187-88.
233. See Dietderich, supra note 209, at 40-41.
234. Id. at 40.
235. Ellickson, supra note 230, at 1200.
236. Id.
237. Id. Efficiency, in this case, means that, assuming hypothetically that property is sold
in a perfectly free market, a rich person will pay more for the right to live in a neighborhood
of rich people than a poor person will pay to live in the same neighborhood; the property is
allocated to the person who values it most. Id.
238. Dietderich, supra note 209, at 31.
239. Id. at 33-34.
240. Id. at 35.
241. Id. at 31-32.
242. Id. at 34.
SUMMER 2010] Citizen Police 1171
1172 University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform
developer losses, especially when coupled with valuable incentives
for developers. 4 '
Third, Ellickson argues that in the long-run, the perceived bene-
fits to the poor-namely an increased stock of affordable
housing-are at least partially off-set by the loss in filtering.144 Fil-
tering is the process by which expensive homes eventually trickle
down to low-income buyers through depreciation and new housing
construction.245 The filtering theory is criticized in part because it is
based on the assumption that the housing market is unitary (i.e., it
does not distinguish between a market for apartments and a mar-
ket for single-family homes) and ignores the economic costs of
converting mansions into multiple homes for low-income resi-
dents. 2 46 Housing policies based on a filter theory have been
blamed for "abandonment, gentrification, the concentration of
poverty, and the perpetuation of racial segregation."
247
Some of the criticisms of inclusionary zoning by Ellickson and
others, especially regarding how such policies have been imple-
mented today, are more persuasive. For example, voluntary
inclusionary zoning that is left to developers to implement, as is
the predominant practice in California, has resulted in the con-
struction of housing for mostly middle-income groups, leaving
those most in need no better off.248 In this sense, New Jersey has
been more successful than California by using mandatory quotas toS • 2 4 9
target the program to those it is intended to help. In both New
Jersey and California, the preference for selling below-market
priced units, rather than renting, negates some of the long-term
benefits of inclusionary zoning, as beneficiaries can simply turn
around and sell their property at the market rate and thus deplete
the new stock of affordable housing.250
More crucial to the thesis of this Note, inclusionary zoning has
also largely failed to integrate racial minorities and urban popula-
tions into wealthier communities. 25 1 Although inclusionary units
typically go to those who legitimately need affordable housing, they
243. Id. at 68-69.
244. Ellickson, supra note 230, at 1186-87.
245. Id. at 1184-85.
246. Dietderich, supra note 209, at 43.
247. Id.
248. Nico Calavita, Kenneth Grimes & Alan Mallach, Inclusionary Housing in California
and New Jersey: A Comparative Analysis, 8 HOUSING POL'y DEBATE 109, 125 (1997) (on file
with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform), available at http://
www.knowledgeplex.org/progra-s/hpd/pdf/hpd-0801calavita.pdf.
249. Id. at 125.
250. Id. at 127.
251. Id. at 129.
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have overwhelmingly served those from the suburban communities
where they are built.25' These include "blue-collar workers, needy
young couples, and divorced mothers with small children, many of
whom had been doubling up with their more affluent suburban
parents. ' '153 Although inclusionary zoning creates the opportunity
for further integration, these programs have to be coupled with
marketing and other informational campaigns to reach out across
the region to minorities and urban residents who might benefit
2-5from such programs. 5 Like all new public benefit programs, the
targeted groups must be informed about the program before they
can take advantage of it.
The lessons gained from the history of inclusionary zoning in
various jurisdictions and in modern economic analysis reveal that
inclusionary zoning policies must be developed with the specific
characteristics of the locality in mind and with clear policy objec-
tives. A system must be developed that emphasizes the importance
of racial and economic integration as well as ensures that the
measures are both effective and sustainable.
CONCLUSION
This Note presents a new approach to promoting racial and
economic integration in housing. Anti-Discrimination Center v. West-
chester County provides a blueprint for an effective enforcement
mechanism of civil rights and fair housing laws at the local level. By
defining the municipal obligation to analyze and address
impediments to fair housing posed by race, the federal court in
Anti-Discrimination Center signaled to the over 1,200 municipalities
across the country that receive CDBG funding that they must fi-
nally take seriously their obligation to encourage a truly integrated
pattern of housing. The court also legitimized the use of the FCA
by a private citizen or non-profit organization to sue a municipality
on behalf of the federal government when the municipality accepts
HUD funding but shirks the attached obligations. A citizen en-
forcement action ensures that true integration policy will not be
hampered by an administration that lacks the political will to en-
force the original intent of the fair housing laws.
The enforcement mechanism illustrated in Anti-Discrimination
Center is but one important piece to providing an effective
252. Id.
253. Id.
254. See id.at 128.
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integration policy. State and local governments must take a close
look at how their zoning policies contribute to the perpetuation of
racially and economically segregated housing patterns. Regional
coordination in the shape of fair-share housing obligations and
inclusionary zoning programs are essential to providing the oppor-
tunity for truly integrated housing. Although a progressive
interpretation of existing legislation might already mandate the
need for inclusionary zoning, federal legislation, such as the statute
suggested by Professor Daye, would provide greater guidance and
uniformity to local municipalities, resulting in a more effective in-
tegration policy. Ultimately, true integration will depend on the
preferences of existing and potential residents of affluent commu-
nities, but by providing the proper incentives and opportunities,
inclusionary zoning and fair-share legislation can go a long way in
fulfilling the promise of the Fair Housing Act passed nearly forty
years ago.
